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REPLY TO BECKER AND FUEST
James R. Hines Jr.
t is an understatement to say that the appropriate taxation of foreign business income
is a controversial and potentially confusing topic. One of the mysteries of international taxation has been that the prescriptions of what, until recently, was the accepted
academic wisdom differs so sharply from widespread international practice. In an
important contribution, Richman (1963) noted that a home government confronted with
the choice of where it would prefer one of its resident taxpayers to allocate a single
unit of capital would weigh the after-foreign-tax return from investing abroad against
the pre-tax return from investing at home. From this observation, she concluded that
countries maximize their own welfare by subjecting foreign income to full current
domestic taxation, permitting only a deduction for foreign tax payments. This analysis
further implies that a policy of taxing foreign income while granting credits for foreign
income tax payments maximizes world welfare.
In fact virtually no countries have policies that resemble those that this framework
describes as optimal and therefore individually rational. Not only do most countries
exempt active foreign business income from taxation, but the small number that do
not nevertheless permit taxpayers to claim credits against domestic tax liability for
foreign tax payments and do not tax foreign source income currently but only when
it is repatriated to the domestic parent company. Hence international practice is to tax
foreign income much less heavily than these theories imply that countries should ever
want to do. This difference suggests either that governments systematically — and
universally — err in their taxation of foreign income, or else that these older welfare
frameworks fail to capture important aspects of the problem of taxing foreign source
income.
More recent analysis of international tax norms challenges the older academic paradigms by calling attention to the importance of tax-induced ownership patterns. Desai
and Hines (2003, 2004), Devereux (2008), and others note that the general equilibrium
impact of taxation on asset ownership — the reallocation of business ownership to taxpreferred owners — and the role of ownership in influencing productivity together carry
very different implications for national tax policies. In a world characterized by shifting
ownership of business assets, countries maximize their own welfares by exempting
active foreign business income from domestic taxation, and maximize world welfare by
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conforming their taxation of foreign income to world norms. The purpose of the paper
by Hines (2008) is to call attention to another tax policy implication of this ownership
framework for analyzing international taxation, which is that the same considerations
apply to domestic expense deductions that generate foreign income; specifically, countries maximize their own welfares by permitting full deduction of domestic expenses,
and maximize world welfare by conforming their deductions to world norms.
The spirited comment by Becker and Fuest (2010) helps to illustrate the basis of these
findings. The welfare function used in the first part of the comment is fundamentally
partial equilibrium in nature, in that it does not incorporate the welfare effects of any
additional domestic investment from foreigners (and domestic residents!) that would
be associated with greater outbound foreign investment. This is reflected in the home
government maximizing the sum of domestic tax revenue and firm profits, but failing
to incorporate tax revenue from foreign investors (and new domestic investors) in the
domestic economy. This is the same government objective function used in the original Richman (1963) framework, and as a result, it is not surprising that the comment
draws conclusions (captured in Propositions 1 and 2) that are similar in spirit to those
of Richman.
The point of the Hines (2008) paper was to consider a home country that optimally
taxes foreign source income, and evaluate the accompanying optimal tax treatment of
domestic expenses that contribute to the production of foreign source income. It is not
possible to perform this exercise using a framework in which the home country taxation
of foreign source income is not optimal. In the partial equilibrium approach used in the
first part of the Becker and Fuest (2010) comment, and reflected in Propositions 1 and
2, it is not optimal to exempt foreign income from domestic taxation; this is, indeed, the
standard Richman (1963) result. The Becker and Fuest (2010) comment shows that if,
in this setting, the home country nevertheless exempts foreign income from taxation,
then it should not permit a deduction for domestic expenses that contribute to foreign
income production. This analysis is correct, but it does not address the point of the Hines
(2008) paper, which is to consider a situation in which governments have chosen their
taxation of foreign income optimally.
It would be fair to say that the modeling framework used in Hines (2008) is anything
but transparent in its treatment of the reasons underlying the optimality of exempting
foreign income from taxation; for example, capital investment and labor inputs do not
appear as arguments of the firm’s production function, instead being implicit — and the
actions of foreign investors are not modeled at all. This might be justified on the basis
of simplicity, but it carries with it the possibility of engendering confusion. In order to
evaluate whether, with a given government objective function, it is optimal to exempt
foreign income from taxation, it is necessary to consider a model that explicitly includes
capital as an argument of the production function; the need to do this is obscured by
the omission of capital from the production functions in Hines (2008). When capital is
explicitly included as an argument of firm production functions, it becomes clear that
exempting foreign income from home country taxation is not optimal in the setting
analyzed in the first part of the Becker and Fuest (2010) comment.
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Similarly including capital as an explicit argument of firm production functions
in equation (9) of Hines (2008) produces the implication that home country welfare
is maximized by exempting foreign income from taxation. The reason, therefore, to
adopt equation (9) as the government’s maximand is that it captures other features of
the economic setting that must hold in order for exemption to be optimal — presumably, as other papers in the literature have analyzed, the impact of shifting ownership.
Equation (9) reflects that additional foreign income production by home country firms
is associated with greater home country income production by foreign investors of a
roughly equivalent amount, who respond to greater outbound investment by home
country firms by increasing their investment in the home country. Equation (9) omits
explicit consideration of foreign firms, but includes them implicitly by dividing the
foreign profits of home country firms by (1 – τ) in recognition of the tax revenue that
the home government will collect from foreign firms whose operations in the home
country are (increasing) functions of the level of foreign activity by home country firms.
The second part of the Becker and Fuest (2010) comment very generously explores
the possibility that the results reported in Hines (2008) could be obtained in an alternative partial equilibrium model in which home country firms have the ability to sell
their foreign affiliates to unrelated foreigners. In this model foreigners appear for the
first time, as potential acquirers of domestically owned foreign affiliates, though not as
investors in the home economy. As the comment reports in its Propositions 3 and 4, the
model implies that firms should not be permitted to deduct all of their domestic expenses
incurred in the production of foreign income. Again, this should not be surprising. The
setting in this part of the paper does not incorporate the domestic effects of greater
foreign investment, and as a result, a true exemption system is not optimal, reflecting
the fact that the model fails to capture all of the benefits of additional foreign income.
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